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Policy Brief

Lack of Cybersecurity in the United States’
Critical Infrastructure
Dean Santos, Jonathan Kovacev, & Kinsey Larson | Purdue University
HONR 399: Security, Technology, and Society | Spring 2021
Instructors: Dr. Dwaine Jengelley (Honors College) & Dr. L. Allison Roberts (PPRI)

Introduction
Technology has revolutionized the nature of information, remote control, and communication itself, but it has
also brought with it tangible dangers. Top minds in the United States, as well as the rest of the world, have seen
those dangers and dedicated their work to mitigate them, developing the ideas and policies necessary to protect
the nation from those dangers, and yet the actual implementation of safety measures within the nation lags
behind.
In the meantime, as U.S. critical infrastructure remains woefully unprotected, the nation opens itself up to a
plethora of cyber-attacks. These attacks can cause damage in many ways. There are the obvious, tangible effects
like costing trillions of dollars [1], poisoning water supplies to cause illness [2], or causing power outages [3], but
we must also consider more subtle, social damages caused as well, such as losing trust, questioning the legitimacy
of polling machines, or losing a sense of security in general. Regardless of the damage caused, it is clear that these
attacks cannot be allowed to continue, and the United States already has a number of policies
and strategies in place to defend itself and its critical infrastructure. However, despite
being theoretically applicable and effective, the nation routinely sees them go
unimplemented even as preventable attacks repeatedly succeed.
What is it about the current U.S. policy that leaves it so vulnerable, and
how can it be remedied? This brief addresses the question and offers
a recommendation.

Current Policy
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
The first piece of active policy highlighted is the newly formed
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Created
in 2018, it works to secure the nation’s critical infrastructure from
cybersecurity threats by researching solutions to possible threats,
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offering penetration testing to identify existing
vulnerabilities and issuing cybersecurity directives [4].
Having a singular agency in charge of securing the
United States’ critical infrastructure streamlines the
process of creating new security measures,
implementing those measures, and responding to
active threats when compared to giving the task to
the Department of Homeland Security or the Central
Intelligence Agency, both of which must also manage
other responsibilities as well [5]. CISA’s existence was
proven to be a great benefit to the nation's
cybersecurity in its first two years, but CISA could be
doing much more than it is currently.

Process 1: Air Gapping
Air gapping is a process when a network of
computers is completely disconnected from all other
networks. Without outside network connections, it
becomes impossible to hack a computer remotely,
which is how the vast majority of cyberattacks are
conducted. A cyberattack, especially one from
another nation, becomes significantly more difficult
to conduct if the attacker must be physically present
in the facility. It is a functionally simple solution to
what appears to be a complex problem.

There are numerous other individual policies equally
varied in efficacy, application, and complexity; these
just demonstrate the width of the scale

Process 2: Cybersecurity Engineering (CSE)
The second process is called Cybersecurity
Engineering (CSE) and seeks to form a top-to-bottom
security seal on an entire system, including all its
component parts, from manufacturing and coding to
operation. It is a more rigorous process that would
require the government to have access to every level
of production used in creating the infrastructure
used in the sector, but the CSE philosophy creates
functionally impenetrable systems. It can also be
implemented more modularly as needed, securing
specific, vulnerable components instead of entire

systems, though with the modularity the
completeness of the seal would be lost. All in all, it is
a relatively high complexity solution that potentially
offers more complete security in all situations.

Risks and Benefits
There are significantly more benefits than risks
when it comes to employing cybersecurity systems.
The majority of concerns lie in ethical considerations,
over-reliance of the integrity of systems, and access
to vital information. National cybersecurity has
access to invaluable amounts of private data and
business information that has been entrusted to it, a
sacrifice that individuals make which comes with
trusting that those people who are in charge of
protecting data do not abuse their power.
Additionally, failures in cybersecurity may go
unnoticed for months or years, leading to massive
loss of money and data while the security failure
remains on other systems [6].

Sacrifices that exist are ultimately necessary ones
compared to alternative of remaining undefended

Cybersecurity protects both the private and public
sectors from threats intended to obtain vital
information, disrupt communications, and destroy
infrastructure. Governmental cyberattacks are being
thwarted by the emergence of improved engineering
techniques that employ secure devices, trusted
suppliers and code with limited flaws. Public
information and infrastructure are becoming more
secure as prime targets, such as water purification
systems and business revenues, are taking a priority
in national defense [2]. As time goes on, systems are
becoming increasingly secure at a rate that threatens
cyber attackers, but there will always be more risks
to cover and methods that bad actors will use to
access various parts of a system. The ever-vigilant
design of systems must allow for future changes and
last as long as possible to ensure security for the
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lifetime of the system. These systems save the
country hundreds of millions of dollars every year,
but failures still lead to massive losses that still need
to be mitigated [1].

Ethical Considerations and
Counterattacks
In an ethical review of cybersecurity, the authors
considered a number of approaches to ethics, as
ethicality is by no means a singular and obvious
thing. For this, we consider the following three
common approaches to determining ethicality:
consequentialist ethics, non-consequentialist ethics,
and agent-centered ethics [7]. Regardless of which of
those approaches we choose to take, protecting
food, energy, healthcare, and water (examples of
critical infrastructure sectors according to CISA) [8],
with any purely defensive policy would certainly be
heralded highly by all approaches alike. Those
sectors, in particular, are generally considered
necessities or near necessities, and protecting them
with no intent to harm the attacker would mean
there is little to argue with. Other sectors with more
questionable things to protect, while probably still
supererogatory in the end for most, have much more
to contend with as the thing being protected is itself
ethically questionable, which makes the ethics of
defending it more questionable.
The ethicality of certain options can be unclear
when organizations start considering whether
offensive measures need to be put in place, such as
a counterattack. A counterattack is when an
organization's systems are taken down by hacking
them. This may be deemed necessary if an
organization is under constant attack, so unless they
take down the root cause of the attacks, the
organization will be in constant danger. However, if
it is possible to make the nation’s critical
infrastructure impregnable, then we need not worry
about the ethics of a counterattack since there will
never be any damage to use as justification to
counterattack with. We thus conclude that
cybersecurity as a whole should be considered as

ethically sound, if not mandatory, depending on the
philosophy to which one subscribes.

Any ethical sacrifices that may exist are ultimately
outweighed

Costs
The obligatory nature of cybersecurity would
mean that most costs are acceptable, so long as two
things hold: (1) that the cost of security is less than
the cost of damages and (2) that the cost is not so
exorbitant that it detracts from the ability to provide
obligatory services elsewhere. The costs can be put
into three categories: monetary, privacy, and
convenience. Monetarily speaking, Information
Technology specialists predict cybersecurity funding
will surpass $1 trillion over the next five years.
However, projections for damage by cyberattacks
are expected to be $6 trillion for 2021 with the
average cost of a data breach of $3.86 million and
taking 191 days to identify breaches [1].

Expensive, but less expensive than being attacked

Another cybersecurity cost is the loss of privacy
and anonymity of people when they are online.
While giving up a little bit of privacy for a large
increase in security seems like a good deal, many
people believe that government increasing online
security could be problematic and fear that their
privacy rights will be affected by people “watching”
what they do on the internet. Another frequently
acknowledged cost to cybersecurity is the social cost
of convenience. Similar to the tradeoff between
security and privacy, there is a tradeoff between
security and convenience regardless of if that
security is cyber or otherwise. The more secure
something is, the more troublesome it becomes to
operate it normally. The exact cost of widespread
cybersecurity tends to be difficult to measure exactly
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since it depends heavily on what policies get
implemented where; in general, however, it is clear
that the cost of an attack will far outweigh the cost
of security.

can provide the impetus that the urgent changes the
United States’ cybersecurity situation deserves.

Policy Recommendation

[1] “2021 Cyber Security Statistics: The Ultimate List of
Stats, Data & Trends.” Purplesec. [Online].
https://purplesec.us/resources/cyber-security-statistics/
(accessed March 30, 2021).

CISA needs to step forward and begin actively and
forcefully managing the nation’s cybersecurity. CISA
already operates with the mission to mitigate risk to
the nation’s critical infrastructure, and the change in
role would not require a very large change in terms
of the powers it has been granted, as they are
already capable of issuing mandates [9]. In essence,
the United States government would have CISA
execute the tasks it has done since its creation in
2018, but simply act more forcefully, requiring that
all critical infrastructure be made secure instead of
simply aiding those who want it. We are tempted to
prescribe specific policies to specific sectors with
specific timeframes, but such an approach lacks a
certain nuance that must exist in the implementation
of cybersecurity nationwide.

CISA appears to be in the prime position to take the
lead in providing immediate, short-term solutions to
stop existing defensive failures while having the
expertise to manage the future of cybersecurity.

Conclusion
The problem the nation’s cybersecurity faces is not
a lack of ideas, it is a lack of urgency. The United
States has in place organizations like CISA to manage
the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure sectors as
well numerous ways to create security through
techniques, such as air gapping and CSE. When
installed properly, these measures can be cost
effective as well as functional, and yet they remain
unimplemented. As individuals, we lack the ability to
influence change ourselves, so we must rely on—and
advocate for—CISA to step forward and forcibly
effect those changes in our stead. As a collective, we
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